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Abstract
Listed firms increasingly strive for a sustainable appearance, which has made sustainability reporting
very popular in recent years. This would be completely rational if sustainability reporting could
enhance shareholder value. This paper investigates from a theoretical perspective which conditions
are sufficient for the individual and collective rationality of sustainability reporting. The analysis
leads to the conclusion that, due to the competition between firms, sustainability reporting generates
a separation equilibrium as long as the reporting costs are proportional to the reported level and
the marginal costs of reporting differ with the true level of sustainability. Although it might be
preferable, a pooling equilibrium with no sustainability reporting cannot be sustained, which is
a result of the so-called prisoner’s dilemma that firms find themselves caught within. The most
important practical implication of the model is a call for external auditing with high assurance
levels to ensure an efficient separation of highly and weakly sustainable firms.
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1. Introduction
Several studies have raised the question of whether environmental and social disclosures are
incrementally informative for capital market participants (e. g., Richardson and Welker, 2001;
Plumlee et al., 2008; Clarkson et al., 2010). This question strictly relates to the issue of whether
and how environmentally and socially responsible behavior is taken into account when making
investment decisions and performing firm evaluations (Moskowitz, 1972, p. 71). This paper starts
from the position that considering environmental, social, and economic issues simultaneously has a
positive effect on shareholder value. It contributes to the literature by developing a comprehensive
theoretical framework that describes conditions under which reporting on corporate sustainability
is individually and collectively rational, and under which conditions it is probably not. The
conclusion is made that firms might be caught in a prisoner’s dilemma when sustainability reporting
is collectively irrational and highly sustainable firms are forced to maintain sustainability reporting
at a high level even though they would prefer to abandon sustainability reporting altogether.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the effects of
corporate sustainability on the market value of firms. Section 3 applies the signaling theory to
sustainability reporting. Section 4 analyzes whether a collectively preferred pooling equilibrium
can be sustained from a signaling game theory perspective. Section 5 concludes and raises some
issues for further research.
2. The Effect of Corporate Sustainability on the Market Value of Firms
The literature on the effects of corporate sustainability on firm value has become extensive in recent
years (e. g., Dowell et al., 2000; Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2009; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008).
However, the lines of argument that can be found are similar: If it is assumed that management acts
rationally and mainly on the behalf of shareholders, introducing corporate sustainability is either
supposed to enhance expected cash flows, reduce investment risk, or both. This enhancement of
future cash flows can result from a correlation between sustainability and efficiency of production
processes as well as cost savings effects with regard to waste disposal, environmental charges, or
recruitment (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1993, 1996; Lo and Sheu, 2007). It is also conceivable that
corporate sustainability reduces expected cash flows due to higher expenditures for new factories
or other implementation costs, but that this is outweighed by the reduction of the cost of capital,
and the net effect on firm value is positive. The reduction of the cost of capital can be attributed
to generating positive moral capital among communities and stakeholders, which can serve as an
insurance-like protection for a firm’s relationship-based intangible assets, and in turn reduce its
exposure to stakeholder risks (Godfrey, 2005). From this perspective, corporate sustainability can
be regarded as a tool to manage environmental, social, and economic risks.
Empirical results about the effects of corporate sustainability on expected cash flows, the cost
of capital, or their aggregate market value are mixed, but generally indicate that in recent years
corporate social and environmental performance has indeed been positively related to financial
performance and market value (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Bird et al., 2007;
Semenova et al., 2009).
The theoretical analysis here is based on the assumption that a positive effect of corporate
sustainability on the market value of a firm would exist provided that the degree to which the
principle of corporate sustainability is followed by an individual firm was fully observable by
capital market participants. However, in reality, corporate sustainability is hard to measure, and for
the majority of investors is not directly observable. Firms need to communicate their sustainable
behavior if they wish to benefit from it in the form of increased shareholder value. Sustainability
reporting is intended to be an instrument for signaling corporate sustainability. Whether it can in
fact serve this purpose depends on some of its characteristics which will be described in detail
below.
3. Sustainability Reporting as a Signaling Instrument and the Definition of
Informational Equilibria
For the example of the labor market, Spence (1973, 1974) describes how the hiring of workers can
be regarded as an investment done under uncertainty. The uncertainty exists with respect to the
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productivity of workers, which is not known to the employer at the time they are hired. Here, the
employer has to make an estimate about this characteristic. Only after some time can this estimate
be confirmed or disproved. To influence the estimate of the employer, a worker can signal his
abilities and productivity through education. The same framework can be applied to firms and
with respect to their level of corporate sustainability. Capital market participants do not know the
true level of corporate sustainability when they invest in a certain firm. Only after some time will
they observe whether the firm’s cash flow and risk profile are consistent with a stakeholder- and
environment-oriented organizational structure. However, firms can attempt to signal their corporate
sustainability to capital market participants through sustainability reporting. They can even feign a
degree of sustainability that is different from what they actually do. Whether this strategy pays off
in the short run depends on whether capital market participants consider the signal to be reliable,
and in the long run whether this belief is confirmed by reality. What is required is an equilibrium
of self-confirming beliefs. Self-confirming here means that the incentives for the firms arising
out of the beliefs of the capital market participants make the company act in a way that confirms
these beliefs. If, for instance, capital market participants more greatly value firms that report a
high level of sustainability, this increase must outweigh the costs of reporting for highly but not for
weakly sustainable firms. If weakly sustainable firms also have an incentive to report a high level
of sustainability, the expectations of the capital market participants will be disproved and require
adjustment.
3.1. Properties of Separating Equilibria
In order to describe the properties of equilibria in which sustainability reporting is sufficient for
distinguishing highly from weakly sustainable firms, the population of firms is assumed to be nearly
homogeneous, i. e., all firms are identical in every aspect except the degree to which they follow
corporate sustainability and their cost-benefit structure with respect to sustainability. Corporate
sustainability might be observed by employees, clients, and other closely related stakeholders
(e. g., people living in the neighborhood of production plants), although it is impossible for capital
market participants to screen all of their potential investment opportunities for sustainable behavior.
Further, it is assumed that the population of firms is divided into weak and high sustainability, i. e.,
only two categories. The proportion of firms that follow a high degree of sustainability is λh, and
the proportion of firms with a low degree of sustainability λl.
Two important functions have to be defined. The first describes the effect of corporate sus-
tainability on the market value of the firm before the costs of reporting are considered. Since the
true level of corporate sustainability is not directly observable by capital market participants, this
function ∆ is a function of the reported level of corporate sustainability D rather than the true level:
∆ = ∆(D). (1)
The specific characteristics of ∆(D) are not well known. Theoretically, even its first derivative could
be both positive or negative. This results from the unanswered question of whether the benefits of
sustainability outweigh its costs on the corporate level. In addition, it is not even known whether
capital market participants expect firms with a higher reported level of corporate sustainability to
be more sustainable. Setting these problems aside for a moment, it can be noticed that the reported
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level D of corporate sustainability is under the discretion of management. Management decisions
will be influenced by the true level of corporate sustainability θ if the costs of reporting depend on
it. Consequently, the second important function to be defined is the cost function C of reporting a
certain level D of corporate sustainability:
C = C(a(θ),D) = a(θ) · D. (2)
It needs to be emphasized that C only refers to the direct costs of reporting. These are the costs
for issuing a sustainability report and, if a higher degree of sustainability is reported than actually
followed, the expenses for so-called “greenwashing” (e. g., organizing charity events and their
exploitation by marketing). It does not include other costs relating to real sustainable behavior and
processes. Through this function, the costs of sustainability reporting are defined as the product of
the reported level D and a factor a. This factor itself is assumed to be a function of the true level of
corporate sustainability. Spence (1973, pp. 358–359) makes the crucial assumption that the costs of
signaling are negatively correlated with the true level as he implicitly defines a(θ) = 1/θ (Hindriks
and Myles, 2006, p. 271). In this way, a higher positive level of true corporate sustainability would
always lead to lower costs of reporting a certain degree of corporate sustainability. An infinite
number of other functions that serve these conditions exists, such as the inverse sigmoid function
a(θ) = e−θ/(1 + e−θ) or the simple quadratic function a(θ) = θ−2. Which function best proxies the
true relationship between the costs of sustainability reporting and real corporate sustainability is an
empirical question.
According to the assumption of rationality, firms maximize their total increase in shareholder
value when they choose between different disclosure levels. Their decision problem can be
expressed as
max
{D}
∆(D) − a(θ) · D (3)
where the costs of reporting are measured as the present value of the cash flows resulting from the
expenses of reporting.
Sustainability reporting is only an efficient instrument of capital market communication if
it reliably separates highly sustainable from weakly sustainable firms. So the solution to the
maximization problem (3) requires a higher reported level of sustainability for highly sustainable
firms than for weakly sustainable firms. This is ensured when the net gains in shareholder value for
highly sustainable firms are higher if they disclose a high level of corporate sustainability rather than
report a low level; for weakly sustainable firms the net gains in shareholder value need to be smaller
if they choose to disclose a high level of corporate sustainability compared to the case that they
report a low level. With Dh (Dl) indicating a high (low) reported level of corporate sustainability
and ah (al) indicating the cost coefficient for highly (weakly) sustainable firms, this translates into
the mathematical expressions
∆(Dh) − ah(θh) · Dh > ∆(Dl) − ah(θh) · Dl (4a)
∆(Dl) − al(θl) · Dl > ∆(Dh) − al(θl) · Dh. (4b)
If Conditions (4a) and (4b) are fulfilled, sustainability reporting manages to separate highly
4
sustainable from weakly sustainable firms. For the weakly sustainable firms, there is no point
in making any efforts to appear sustainable at all. This results from the fact that capital market
participants immediately realize that a firm is of low corporate sustainability if it reports a lower
level than Dh. Hence, in such a separating equilibrium Dl will be zero. Then conditions (4a) and
(4b) provide the lower and upper boundary of the reported level of corporate sustainability for the
highly sustainable firms:
∆(Dh) − ∆(Dl)
al(θl)
< Dh <
∆(Dh) − ∆(Dl)
ah(θh)
. (5)
Since reporting a higher level of sustainability is assumed to be more costly, and in the model only
two different levels of corporate sustainability exist, there is no incentive for highly sustainable
firms to report a higher level of corporate sustainability than the minimum to ensure that they are
distinguished from the low level firms. Thus, they will report a level of corporate sustainability that
is marginally higher than that expressed by the left-hand side of Inequation (5). This inequation
further shows that, if the marginal costs of reporting as well as the effect of reporting on shareholder
value differ, there will always be a level of sustainability reporting that ensures separation of the
highly from the weakly sustainable firms. Therefore, different marginal costs of reporting and
different effects of reported levels of sustainability on shareholder value are sufficient conditions for
the existence of a reporting level Dh that ensures separation.
3.2. Violation of the Critical Assumptions
If the assumption of different marginal costs of reporting or the assumption of variable effects
of reported sustainability on shareholder value does not hold, the firms will end up in a pooling
equilibrium in which no effort is spent on sustainability reporting. The proof is quite simple: If the
marginal costs of reporting do not differ, no Dh exists that satisfies Inequation (5). Both highly and
weakly sustainable firms see the opportunity to gain an increase in shareholder value of ∆(Dh) if
they report a higher level of sustainability than the others. Since the incentives do not differ between
the groups, in the first round they will report up to the level at which the costs of reporting equal
the positive effect of being seen as highly sustainable. Hence, equal marginal costs of reporting
and competition between both groups make sustainability reporting an instrument that has neither
a value for the individual firm, nor one that can serve as a signal to separate the highly from the
weakly sustainable firms. In the second round, capital market participants will anticipate that
sustainability reporting has no information value and disregard it when making their investment
decisions. Therefore, in the third round no firm has an incentive to report on sustainability at all.
Only then can an equilibrium with self-confirming beliefs be reached.
Constant effects of reported sustainability on shareholder value imply that capital market
participants do not value corporate sustainability or sustainability reporting from the very start.
This leads to the same outcome as no difference in the marginal costs of reporting, although here it
is even more direct. When firms see that their effort in sustainability reporting will not be rewarded,
there is no incentive to spend any effort in doing it, and firms will renounce the use of this instrument
in general.
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3.3. Properties of Pooling Equilibria
As shown above, a lack of divergence in the marginal reporting costs leads to a pooling equilibrium
in which sustainability reporting is of no use. Since by assumption sustainability reporting is
the only potential signaling instrument, in such an equilibrium capital market participants cannot
distinguish between highly and weakly sustainable firms. Therefore, if the proportions of both
groups are known or at least can be estimated accurately, every firm will gain an average increase
in shareholder value of λh · ∆(θh) + λl · ∆(θl). Note here that the increase in shareholder value
depends on the true level of corporate sustainability rather than the degree with which sustainability
is reported.
Even when none of the critical assumptions is violated, the pooling equilibrium might be
preferable for both highly and weakly sustainable firms. That is true if the average increase in
shareholder value exceeds the increase in shareholder value highly sustainable companies would
gain in a separating equilibrium:
λh · ∆(θh) + λl · ∆(θl) > ∆(Dh) − ah(θh) · Dh. (6)
The value of Dh is determined from the left-hand side of Inequation (5), whereby the reported level
of sustainability is set to the only rational level of zero for weakly sustainable firms. Thus, it follows
λh · ∆(θh) + λl · ∆(θl) > ∆(Dh) − ah(θh) · ∆(Dh) − ∆(θl)al(θl) . (7)
Knowing that λl = 1 − λh as well as that in a separating equilibrium only highly sustainable firms
report a high level of sustainability [∆(Dh) = ∆(θh); ∆(Dl) = ∆(θl)], rearranging leads to
λh > 1 − ah(θh)al(θl) ⇔ λl <
ah(θh)
al(θl)
. (8)
Inequation (8) shows that a pooling equilibrium with no signaling is preferred if the highly sus-
tainable firms are a majority, where majority is defined as a proportion exceeding 1 − ah(θh)/al(θl).
The inequation spans a surface boundary in the three-dimensional space that divides the vectors
(λh, θh, θl) in those of preferred pooling (above) and separating equilibria (below). Figure 1 shows
this for cases of a(θ) = 1/θ and a(θ) = e−θ/(1 + e−θ).
Whether a pooling or separating equilibrium is preferred depends on the concrete values of
the parameters λh, θh, and θl. They indicate to a point above the surface boundary if the true
levels of corporate sustainability do not greatly differ, the costs of sustainability reporting are not
very sensitive to the true level of corporate sustainability, and/or when the proportion of highly
sustainable firms is relatively large. If the cost functions of sustainability do not differ at all, the
surface boundary would be a hyperplane at the bottom of the three-dimensional space. Here,
pooling would always be preferred.
4. Sustainability Reporting as a Signaling Game when Pooling is Collectively Preferred
The analysis so far has shown that under certain circumstances both highly and weakly sustainable
firms would prefer to abstain from any sustainability reporting rather than enforce a separating
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Figure 1. Preferences for Separating and Pooling Equilibria when Costs of Sustainability Reporting are Proportional
to the Inverse of True Corporate Sustainability (Left-hand Side) and Determined by an Inverse Sigmoid Function
(Right-hand Side).
equilibrium. Now the question arises of whether a pooling equilibrium of no sustainability reporting
is actually sustainable. Even though a pooling equilibrium might be collectively preferable, it may
also be individually rational to deviate from it.
To predict how firms act when pooling is collectively preferred, sustainability reporting will
be modeled below as a game between the two blocks of highly and weakly sustainable firms. The
standard procedure to predict the outcome of such games is to search for strategic choices that are
stable, i. e., no party can be better off by unilaterally changing its strategy (Kohlberg and Mertens,
1986, p. 1003). As Nash (1951, p. 286) points out, pairs of opposing “good [reporting] strategies”
are sought here. In the framework of sustainability reporting, the strategies are the reported levels of
sustainability Di and D−i. The subscripts i and −i indicate the different blocks of firms. A so-called
Nash equilibrium is then defined as
∆i(D∗i ,D−i) ≥ ∆i(D′i ,D−i) ∀D′i ,∀i. (9)
Every strategy D−i can be answered by the other party in three ways: reporting the same level of
sustainability, deviating to a higher level, or deviating to a lower level. When deviating to a higher
level is chosen, only a marginal deviation can be rational since this ensures that the increase in
shareholder value is ∆(Dh) instead of the pooling value, while costs are minimized. Deviating to a
lower level can only be rational if the zero level is chosen because the zero level is the cost-optimal
alternative of all reporting levels that result in a change in shareholder value of ∆(Dl).
From the perspective of the firms, it is rational to deviate to a marginally higher level Di =
D−i + dD if the net gain from winning ∆(Dh) − ∆(Dl) exceeds the costs of reporting, ai(θi) · Di.
Therefore, Di = D−i + dD is the best response to strategy D−i as long as
Di <
∆(Dh) − ∆(Dl)
ai(θi)
. (10)
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If D−i equals or exceeds the right-hand side of Inequation (10), deviation to the zero level is the
best response. If D−i is lower, it is always possible to find a value of Di that is also lower than the
right-hand side of Inequation (10) but marginally higher than D−i. As can already be seen, reporting
the same level of corporate sustainability is never a best response to any other strategy. The reaction
function is given by
Di(D−i) =
D−i + dD for D−i < ∆(Dh)−∆(Dl)ai(θi)0 for D−i ≥ ∆(Dh)−∆(Dl)ai(θi) . (11)
The left-hand side of Figure 2 shows the reaction functions of both parties when the cost coefficient
ai is half as high for the highly sustainable firms than for the weakly sustainable firms. The functions
are discontinuous at the critical levels of reported sustainability as defined by Inequations (10) and
(11) and consequently do not cross.
Figure 2. Reaction Functions of Weakly and Highly Sustainable Firms Showing the Best Response to Each Other’s
Reported Level of Sustainability (Left-hand Side) in a Multi-period Framework with High Costs of Changing the
Reported Level of Sustainability (Right-hand Side).
Hence, no combination of Di and D−i can be found that satisfies condition (9), and no Nash
equilibrium exists. The consequences of this insight are profound. Standard game theory does not
provide an answer regarding which level of reported sustainability the firms are supposed to choose.
The solution to this problem could be setting up a multi-period framework in which one party is
selected as the beginner and the other as the follower. Here the follower could give a best response
to the decision of the beginner. In the next period the beginner reacts with his response and so
on. It can easily be seen that this would end up in cyclical behavior: In the interval from zero to
Di =
∆(Dh)−∆(Dl)
ai(θi)
, the firms overbid each other until the highly sustainable firms marginally cross the
border, and the weakly sustainable firms fall back to the zero reporting level. In the next round, the
best response for the highly sustainable firms is reducing their reported level to a value marginally
above zero, and the cycle begins again.
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Such behavior is in reality not observable, at least not in the short run. Firms do not permanently
change their corporate sustainability strategy in response to the strategies of others. Choosing
a certain level of corporate sustainability and sustainability reporting is a strategic decision that
cannot be altered continuously. After all, this would result in additional costs due to the perpetual
changes and a decline in the company’s credibility resulting from their permanently altering signals
they were sending. These costs are not considered in the basic model. If the costs of altering the
reported level of sustainability are considerably high and outweigh any gains in shareholder value,
the firms will choose a level of reported sustainability that ensures that in the following rounds no
change has to be made because the other party would overbid the own level. Here, the best response
is the one with respect to all of the following rounds. The only levels that fulfill this condition are
Di >
∆(Dh)−∆(Dl)
ai(θi)
for the highly sustainable firms and D−i = 0 for the weakly sustainable firms. The
multi-period reaction functions are then shaped as shown in the right hand side of Figure 2. The
only point of intersection lies at Di =
∆(Dh)−∆(Dl)
ai(θi)
+ dD; D−i = 0 and depicts the Nash equilibrium
(NE) that satisfies condition (9). Hence, even if a pooling equilibrium is Pareto-dominating, the
only equilibrium outcome is a separating equilibrium in which the highly sustainable firms report a
level of sustainability that barely forces the weakly sustainable firms to abstain from sustainability
reporting. Thus, in this case weakly and highly sustainable firms are caught in a situation that is
referred to as a (multi-period) prisoner’s dilemma (Tucker, 1950, pp. 7–8). The individually rational
behavior leads to a collectively inefficient outcome.
5. Conclusion
The analysis of corporate sustainability reporting from a game theory perspective leads to three
conclusions:
1. If the critical assumptions of differing reporting costs for different levels of true corporate
sustainability hold, there is always a level of reported sustainability that ensures a separation
of the highly from the weakly sustainable firms.
2. If the highly sustainable firms are a majority and/or the advantages in the costs of sustainability
reporting of the highly sustainable firms are relatively small (i. e., condition (8) holds), both
highly and weakly sustainable firms would prefer to abstain from sustainability reporting and
set up a pooling equilibrium instead.
3. A pooling equilibrium can only be sustained if the critical assumption of differing costs
does not hold. Otherwise the outcome of the game is always a Pareto-dominated separating
equilibrium (prisoner’s dilemma).
Therefore, the predicted outcome of the analytical model depends on the specific values of its
parameters. These values can be determined by observing the actual business world and further
empirical studies. Intuition can also provide some hints. If the degree of sustainability is overstated,
issuing sustainability reports might be slightly but not much costlier due to the measures that may
need to be taken to maintain the facade. Furthermore, the amount of firms discovering the potentials
of corporate sustainability appear to be on the continual rise along with the amount of sustainability
reports that are being issued (see Kolk, 2003; Jose and Lee, 2006; Barkemeyer et al., 2009). Thus,
intuition indeed suggests that competition between highly and weakly sustainable firms enforces a
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separating equilibrium even though both would prefer the pooling solution, and both highly and
weakly sustainable firms are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma. This outcome of the model calls for
measures that increase the reliability of sustainability reports, for instance external auditing with
high assurance levels. High assurance levels have the potential to increase the difference between
the cost coefficients of highly and weakly sustainable firms, and in doing so might increase the
likelihood of an efficient separating equilibrium.
The analysis conducted here very obviously has some limitations. First of all, the assumption that
only two kinds of firms exist is not realistic. Various degrees and dimensions of true sustainability
exist, and every one of them may be rewarded by the capital market in a different way. In reality,
there is an n-firm game rather than a two-party setup. In addition, true corporate sustainability
was considered in this paper to be a constant, even though companies can choose their true levels,
at least in the long run. Consequently, not only the reported level is subject to the game theory
analysis, but the true level of corporate sustainability as well. The most important limitation of the
analysis seems to be the assumption that firms will gain the average increase in shareholder value if
both parties report the same level and do not differ from each other in their reporting practices. This
implies that capital market participants have knowledge about the true proportions of highly and
weakly sustainable firms in the population. The question thus arises from where this knowledge
might result when no effective reporting about corporate sustainability exists. The answers to
this question are sparse indeed, so the most promising one is experience from the past: Capital
market participants can learn from former investments what impact exposure of their firms had on
economic, environmental, and social risks.
Further analytical research can aim at mitigating some of the limitations mentioned above.
Nevertheless, even more interesting would be the search for answers to the empirical questions that
have emerged. How do the costs of sustainability reporting relate to the true level of sustainability?
And would it indeed be preferable for firms to abstain from sustainability reporting and implement
more reliable instruments for signaling true corporate sustainability? The possible methodical
approaches to answer these questions vary greatly. Content analysis provides the opportunity to
measure the reported level of sustainability, while in-depth sustainability rankings from certain
agencies deliver proxies for the true levels, and can even serve as explanatory variables.
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